The Normandy format may resume at the level of advisors to heads of state this week in Berlin. However, during this time, Britain and the U.S. will continue to insist that Russia is going to invade Ukraine, while Ukraine accuses the German publication Bild of publishing disinformation about Ukraine's planned aggression. Maria Zolkina, an analyst with the Foundation for Democratic Initiatives, discusses the balance of power in Europe ahead of the Berlin meeting.
Was the misunderstanding, which arose after CNN's publication about the conflict in the negotiations between Biden and Zelensky, overcome by a week of visits of the heads of Britain, the Netherlands, Poland, and Turkey to Ukraine?
Basically, it has now become clear that the issue of assessing the situation is different and the claim of the Ukrainian side to its Western partners has become clear. Because there is no problem as such. The Ukrainian side and the Western partners assess it absolutely adequately. But in the public space the Western countries, in particular the USA, deliberately slightly overestimate the probability of the worst scenario - a military invasion by Russia, because the society needs to be explained what the efforts are aimed at. And the Ukrainian side is trying to somewhat reduce the probability of the worst-case scenario. But due to the fact that the President's office, in particular Zelensky himself, makes mistakes exactly in public communication, it looks very strange. Instead of saying "we are considering different scenarios and are preparing for everything, but we do not think that Russia will go on the offensive now, in the next two weeks", we hear some twisted, manipulative claims to our Western partners - as if they are voicing non-existent threats. That is, the problem here is one of public communication rather than a real assessment of the situation by both sides.
Zelensky is not an experienced diplomat; in 2.5 years he failed to master those skills of public diplomacy and correct formulation of his thoughts that professional diplomats who have worked all their lives in the state system possess. Therefore, it became more or less clear what the presidents meant, and there is no conflict between them as such.
As for the visits that took place during the week, they were not so much aimed at resolving the misunderstanding that had crept in between the two countries, but were tied to Ukraine's bilateral relations with those countries. But the visit of the British prime minister may have indirectly reduced the degree of public tension between the U.S. administration and the Ukrainian administration, because Britain gives the same messages about the inevitability of war as the U.S. side does.
The political advisors of the Normandy format are meeting in a week. Should we expect Ukraine to be able to defend its position and point out to Russia that it is Russia that has not fulfilled its obligations?
So far, the Ukrainian side has very firmly rejected Russia's demands that political issues be resolved first, without security guarantees. In general, the main topic of the 8-hour meeting in Paris on January 26 was trying to get Ukraine to agree to some format of direct negotiations with the occupation administrations. This was the number one topic. And so far, the Ukrainian delegation, in particular Yermak, has refused very harshly.
What can we expect? I think that the Ukrainian side will not agree to such proposals during the meeting in Berlin. But there is a risk that the Ukrainian side will continue to be pressured, not only by the Russians, but perhaps indirectly, by the Germans and the French to make indirect concessions, to engage in dialogue. And I would say that the conflict that has arisen in the assessments of the situation - whether war is inevitable or whether there are other scenarios - is one of the reasons why the Ukrainian side has been very critical of the extremely harsh statements by the United States. After all, Ukraine understands that if all participants in negotiations with Russia - both the United States and Europe and Britain - proceed from only two options - either concessions to Russia or an outright new attack on Ukraine, then in this situation it will be easier to put pressure on Ukraine to agree to political agreements with the Russian Federation. And just this degree of public tension after the British and U.S. statements fuels the risk.
There are different reasons why Ukraine was against the scenario of a new invasion being considered the only and inevitable - there are economic reasons, because investors are terminating contracts, withdrawing money, the value of government bonds on international markets has also fallen heavily, i.e. the outlook is very negative - but another reason is connected precisely to the negotiations. Because Russia is now demanding concessions from Western countries on various issues - from the deployment of NATO troops in Eastern Europe to the Minsk agreements and Ukraine in general. Ukraine is worried that in order to achieve détente and avoid the only scenario of outright war, our Western partners may offer Ukraine to make concessions to Russia in particular - in the Normandy format.
And so the upcoming meeting should be the last before the stage of any real détente. That is, Donbas and the Minsk agreements should not be part of the negotiation process between Russia and the West. Because there is not a single chance that the arrangements that Russia will agree to will be at least to some extent beneficial to Ukraine. It will definitely be a concession on the part of Ukraine. Veiled or direct, but a concession, because a direct dialogue or a special status of these territories is not in the interests of Ukraine. And if the Ukrainian side makes such concessions, it will automatically affect the stability inside the country - we will definitely have protests, it will actually undermine the legitimacy of the President... There is an active part of people, and as opinion polls from 2015 show, a large part of society has a stable rejection of all the compromises that Russia proposes. And active citizens will take to the streets and protest in various forms. Therefore, at the meeting to come, attempts to resolve the issue of the Donbass should end, as long as somehow, with the exception of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the West manages to achieve some kind of stabilization with the Kremlin. Against this background, when the stakes are much higher than the issue of Donbas, trying to resolve the situation with the implementation of the Minsk agreements is a sure loser for Ukraine. Becoming a bargaining chip in a big game certainly cannot be in Ukraine's interest.
Macron's attempts to give additional impetus to the Normandy Format appear against the backdrop of these dangers. In addition, calls by French presidential candidates for a better understanding of Putin are alarming.
Ukraine's position in assessing these risks and the position of our partners are different. That is, there is a risk that they may compromise on the issue of, for example, the Minsk agreements in Donbas against the background of their desire to achieve some sort of détente with Russia. That is, for them it will be only a small episode against the background of the list of large-scale requirements that Russia has put forward: not to accept Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, to regulate the number of the American contingent in Europe, to agree on the number of exercises and so on. From the point of view of France and Germany, the issue of Donbas and the Minsk agreements seems much less extensive, and it can be negotiated in exchange for a conditional and illusory détente with Russia. The main claims in the public space referred to Germany, but France is no different in this respect. This is the traditional French policy towards Russia. And now why it is impossible to form the Normandy process - there will be no focus on risks, but simply a desire to close all these Russian claims at the expense of Donbas and to close this question in general. The very conjuncture of the Normandy format, the internal structure of this quartet now is radically different from what it was in previous years. Because for the first time since 2014, Germany has lost its leadership amid a change of government within the country. And now the German government is an undecided participant.
On the one hand, they declare their willingness to stop Nord Stream 2. And on the other hand, they are trying to prevent very harsh sanctions and are negotiating with Washington, so that the U.S. will not lead with its sanctions to stop the same Nord Stream-2. They do not sell and prevent other NATO countries from selling weapons to Ukraine. And in principle, their position right now in diplomatic terms is not tough. But this is a temporary phenomenon. And France, which picked up the leadership of the Normandy Quartet, forced or not, is absolutely not ready for this. They have always been in Germany's fairway and Germany has always been the main moderator. The French moan has only been active once - in 2019, when there was an attempt to organize a new Summit. Macron was very effective in getting involved, he prepared the 2019 Paris Summit. But at other times, France did not play a leading role in Normandy. And now that this role has been given to them by circumstances, we, Ukraine, cannot be sure that they will be as tough on Russia on the issues of "no direct dialogue with the DNR/LNR formations," "no direct elections" in the occupied territories, "no special status" as Germany and France were before.
Because in the French foreign policy specifically in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict there is a specific gap or feature that we notice: as soon as there is some critical situation, instability, something changes in the negotiations, the French are more inclined to try to negotiate with Russia, to make concessions to it, rather than to defend some clear, tough line of behavior. Because when nothing substantial happens, and everything was predictable, the French delegation behaved very consistently - they defended "no direct dialogue, no direct elections, no special status, first security - then elections, first control of the border - then elections" and so on. And for example, the correspondence that was leaked by Lavrov's office demonstrates very clearly that despite all Russia's desires, both the French and German minister, even in private correspondence, adhered to a very clear, understandable line that was beneficial for Ukraine. But as soon as there is any turbulence in the diplomatic process, the French delegation immediately seizes every chance to negotiate. And who is easier to pressure? It is clear that the one who looks weaker, who bites less, i.e. Ukraine. That's why the internal policy of the Normandy quartet itself is not particularly advantageous to the Ukrainian side right now. Because they want to achieve some kind of détente and warming, they want to achieve some kind of conviction that there will not be a new big offensive on Ukraine. Plus the internal process in France, when it is necessary to give the voter some kind of success in the elections, and here, imagine, it stops the inevitable offensive at all. For him, of course, this is a big plus in the rating for the voters. That is why it is not profitable for Ukraine right now. For us it is much more profitable to negotiate on Donbas under the pressure of a large-scale game between Russia and the West not to conduct negotiations at all.
To what extent does Ukraine's leadership act in its foreign policy with an eye on the people of the country?
Zelensky cannot avoid claims if he makes concessions. I will say even more: for the president's office, it is the possibility of public reaction inside the country that is the main deterrent to not going for any agreements in the Normandy format. Because they were playing on the edge in 2019, and Zelensky's desire to negotiate with Russia was very high. But after the Paris Summit, when he outlined some red lines - these are security issues, control on the border, Russia's willingness to negotiate has fallen. And most importantly - the opportunity to agree has disappeared after March 2020, when Andrei Yermak together with Dmitry Kozak informally, without Berlin and Paris, at the level of "advisory council" tried to organize a direct dialogue with the so-called "republics". This initiative was leaked to the media, and it provoked the harshest negative reaction in Ukrainian society, as well as the harshest reaction from Berlin and Paris. Because they were not privy to this process. It really undermined trust, and the French and Germans just stopped it, because a lot of things became clear. After Paris two months had passed and it became clear that the Russian side would not fulfill any of the security and even humanitarian points.
The fact that Erdogan suggested Istanbul for a contact group meeting is his attempt to get into the Normandy format?
We understand that any moderator has his own motives, and Turkey's are particularly strong. Against the background of what is happening in the state itself - the economic and financial losses, as well as the risks that have arisen in relations with Western partners and on NATO - it is very important for Turkey to increase its international weight in the region - in particular in the Black Sea region. If it manages to intensify negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, it will automatically be considered a certain détente, in which the parties will start a new negotiation process on new terms. This would reduce the risk of a new invasion or intensification of hostilities. But for Ukraine I would not say that such a Ukraine-Russia-Turkey format is ideal, because here, despite the fact that we have made it clear that in principle we agree, but nevertheless because of Turkey's very fickle and flexible position, which sometimes opposes Russia harshly and demonstratively in some issues, but on the other hand it ends up in a new "pact" on friendship and warm relations arise again. Such fickleness is not very convenient for us. This is why I think it will not be beneficial for Russia to agree to these new negotiations for two reasons: first, the fact that it is not in principle beneficial for Russia to change the format of the negotiations, but it is beneficial for Russia to deal with those on whom it has influence. Secondly, Putin does not need a new meeting with Zelensky, neither in the Normandy format nor on a new platform.
So, for him, any meeting with Zelensky is a sure loser?
I would not say that it is a losing proposition - if they manage to reach some preliminary agreements. That is, what Russia is trying to achieve now: at the lowest level of the Normandy format, experts who are not even formally representatives of some state institution - they do not come there in the status of the head of the presidential office - no, only in the status of a "political adviser. Naturally, this is the game that Russia has been playing since 2020, when Russia is trying to bring the negotiations down to the lowest level. The logic of Russia is to reach a low-level decision to bring all other issues and operational issues to the level of the Minsk Group. And so no meeting of either the president or the ministers after December 2019 is possible and unnecessary. And Russia avoids contacts at the level of institutions, at the level of leaders in every way possible. They only agree to meet at the Normandy level if the advisers reach an unconditional agreement on what is already there. And the leaders will then meet to discuss the decision that has already been made. But the Ukrainian side will not give such a decision. And if they, let's say, meet on Erdogan's initiative, it will be a new dynamic in any case. These are the new messages that the Ukrainian side is talking about. This is an opportunity to reset the Minsk agreements, to come out with completely new proposals, Russia is not interested in this. It wants to crush Ukraine in the format in which it now has influence by blackmailing other participants in the format. That is why Putin does not need a new meeting with Zelensky at all; he does not want to discuss anything with him.