Five days in August 2008: 10 years for lessons

  • Five days in August 2008 10 years for lessons

Кyiv: These days the world mentions Russia's August aggression against Georgia, which has given way to significant changes in modern international relations. It can be said that without this short-lived, but saturated event of the war, there would be no annexation of the Crimea, and aggression in the Donbass, and many other negative events.

However, the conflict in the Caucasus is significantly different from the events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, since it was long-lasting and had a diverse background, including religious ones. In August 2008, only a culmination of the Kremlin's aggressive policy took place against the backdrop of the Olympic Games in Beijing. Russia since the 90s supported the aspirations of Ossetians and Abkhazians to create their own quasi-states. After coming to power in Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, the desire of Tbilisi to return lost lands in the early 90's not only received a powerful rhetorical confirmation, but also gained practical implementation in matters of modernization of the Armed Forces. The Georgian army quickly became a threat to Russian interests in the Caucasus as combat capability.

When it comes to negative consequences for Georgia (and Ukraine) of the consequences of the NATO Bucharest summit, in which both post-Soviet states did not receive the MAP to prepare for joining the Alliance despite the persistent efforts of the United States, they often forget about a series of unfriendly Russian moves. In particular, the mass deportation of Georgian citizens from Russia in 2006, where they earned a living for themselves and their families, a negative perception in Moscow of the return of actual control over Ajaria, etc. The Kremlin was also seriously preparing to "put Georgians in place", initially arranging for them to hunt in Russia, then attacking the country.

It is interesting to note that the technologies of preparation for intervention in the Caucasus have a lot to do with Russia's later actions in the Donbass. In particular, the use of "Cossack" formations as a cover for preparation for aggression "left" by the Russian military after the exercises "Kavkaz-2008" in the territory of South Ossetia, several dozen tanks and other armored vehicles, even the charge of Bidzini Ivanishvili to Mikheil Saakashvili in the intensification of the war . In the Ukrainian realities of 2014 and later, he played only the "factor of the peacekeepers", apparently, for the reason that aggression in the east of Ukraine was preceded by the annexation of the Crimea.

Recall that then social networks have not yet been massively distributed in the post-Soviet space, but have concluded in Russia on the aftermath of the second Israeli-Lebanese war in which Hezbollah managed to create a negative image of the IDF. Therefore, in the military order of Russian units that fought in South Ossetia, there were a lot of journalists who covered the situation in favorable light for Russia. This point of view was effectively transmitted to the post-Soviet space. The Georgian media tried to appeal primarily to the West, but it was virtually neutralized by both the Kremlin's efforts and its own passivity.

The Republican Administration of George Bush Jr. has completed the last months of August 2008, and the European Union has decided to try the peacekeeping tog. She was French President Nicolas Sarkozy as the head of the European Council. The possibilities for maneuvering in Georgia, of which 20% were occupied, was not enough, so she was forced to stick to the Sarkozy peace plan. Russia recognized the "independence" of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which remain unrecognized by the international community and financed from the federal budget. The report by Heidi Tagliavini on the origins of the conflict, promulgated next year, caused Georgia's indignation and Russia's satisfaction. Subsequently, she will appear in the Trilateral Contact Group on the Donbass.

Ukraine, which ten years ago was associated with Georgia's strategic partnership relations, was on a geopolitical twine. Ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which left the bases in the Crimea, participated in the aggression against Georgia. Official Kyiv has tried to help Tbilisi supply both at arms level and at the political level. Unfortunately, the position of Viktor Yushchenko and the NUNS significantly dissociated from the actions of BYuT, as a result, the Verkhovna Rada failed to accept the statement condemning Russian aggression.


Ten years after the start of Russian aggression, the aggressive intentions of the Kremlin became apparent to many in the world, the number of its victims grew at the expense of the dead and wounded in Ukraine, still occupying 20% ​​of the territory, 12% of the territory of Moldova, and 7% of Georgia. The feeling of "deep concern" remains the main foreign policy instrument in EU relations with Russia. Almost all of Russia's neighbors were convinced of the need to build their own armies and integrate into the Euro-Atlantic security system. Mikheil Saakashvili's political career continues in the Netherlands, but he promises to return to Georgia, where the entire power of power belongs to his opponents of the "Georgian dream". The traces of the war in Georgia are strangely combined with a large number of Russian tourists who enjoy Georgian hospitality. The country itself is again approaching NATO membership.


Yevgeny Magda


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